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FEDERAL INCOME TAX-TAxPAYER WHO CARRIED BRIEFCASE-
SIZED BAG OF TOOLS ALLOWED TO DEDUCT TRANSPORTATION
ExPENSES INCURRED IN DRIVING To AND FROM HIS HOME
AND VARIOUS WORK SITES AS AN ORDINARY AND NECESSARY
BUSINESS EXPENSE. Sullivan v. Commissioner (2d Cir. 1966)
Lawrence D. Sullivan, a wire lather employed by a New York City
construction company incurred $1,494.72 of expenses for the use of
his car in driving to and from his Staten Island home and different
job sites in and around New York City.1 He deducted this amount as
an ordinary and necessary business expense on his federal income tax
return for 1962.2 Sullivan carried the tools of his trade in a briefcase-
sized bag which weighed approximately thirty-two pounds when
filled with tools. He was unable to leave his tools at the various job
sites as there were no safe storage places, and often, his employer
would telephone him in the evening and direct him to go to a different
job site the following morning. Sullivan testified that he had a bad
1 Sullivan's deduction was not for transportation costs between job sites. Any
expenses incurred driving between job sites would be deductible without question,
Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1(g) (1958).
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162. TRADE OR BUSINESS EXPENSES.
(a) In general.
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business....
A deduction allowable under Section 162 may fall within either of two categories; it
may be a deduction for adjusted income, or it may be from adjusted gross income.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 62. ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME DEFINED.
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "adjusted gross income" means, in the case
of an individual, gross income minus the following deductions:
(1) Trade and business deductions.
The deductions allowed by this chapter .. .which are attributable to a
trade or business carried on by the taxpayer, if such trade or business does
not consist of the performance of services by the taxpayer as an employee.
(2) Trade and business deductions of employees.
(B) Expenses for travel away from home.
The deductions allowed by part VI... which consist of expenses of travel,
meals, and lodging while away from home, paid or incurred by the taxpayer
in connection with the performance by him of services as an employee.
(C) Transportation expenses.
The deductions allowed by part VI (sec. 161 and following) which consist
of expenses of transportation paid or incurred by the taxpayer in connection
with the performance by him of services as an employee.
If the allowable deduction cannot be found within the purview of Section 62, the
deduction is then taken from adjusted gross income. INr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 63.
TAXABLE INCOME DEFINED. (a) General rule. "Except as provided in subsection (b),
for purposes of this subtitle the term 'taxable income' means gross income, minus the
deductions allowed by this chapter ...."
The Second Circuit apparently took the position that Section 162(a) applied without
reference to travel or transportation expenses; therefore, the expenses in question were
deductible from adjusted gross income.
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knee which made walking and standing difficult. The deduction was
disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service. The Tax Court, in affirm-
ing the disallowance held that an "employee's trips to and from work
which could only be characterized as nonbusiness trips when no tools
are carried, are not transformed into business trips of the employee by
his carrying his tools to and from his place of employment."'
On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, held, reversed
and remanded. Petitioner should be allowed to deduct his reasonable
driving expenses upon a showing that he would have used public
transportation but for the fact that he had to carry his tools. 4 If the
petitioner would have driven to and from work, whether or not he
carried tools, then he should be allowed a deduction based on a
proportionate share of the total transportation expense which reason-
ably would be allocated to the expense of transporting the tools.
Sullivan v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966).
Generally, the cost of transportation from one's home to his place
of employment is a personal expense, and thus nondeductible under
Section 162.i However, recent opinions demonstrate that the courts
are closely examining each case to determine whether there are addi-
tional facts indicating that the expenses are actually ordinary and
necessary business expenses6 rather than personal, commuter ex-
3 Lawrence D. Sullivan, 45 T.C. 217, 221 (1965).
4 The court in allowing either a partial or full transportation deduction subjected
the deduction to a maximum based upon the cost of any feasible alternative means of
storing taxpayer's tools. Sullivan v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir.
1966).
5 The principal authority for this rule is Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465
(1946) (taxpayer's travel expense between home and office in a different city held
nondeductible). A more recent statement of the rule is found in Steinhort v. Commis-
sioner, 335 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1964). "Deeply ingrained in the whole tax struc-
ture . . . is the basic proposition that the cost of going to and from home and an
established place of business is a nondeductible personal expenditure." See INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 262 (". . . no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or
family expenses.") and Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1 (1959). ". • • [T]he taxpayer's cost of
commuting to his place of business or employment are personal expenses and do not
qualify as deductible expenses." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (1959) "(e) Commuters' fares
are not considered as business expenses and are not deductible."
6 "Ordinary" and "necessary" have been defined in the statutory context as follows:
"(1) An expense is 'ordinary,' within the meaning of these statutory provisions, where
the expense is common and accepted in the general industry or type of activity in which
the taxpayer is engaged; and (2) An expense is 'necessary' where it is appropriate and
helpful in furthering the taxpayer's business or income-producing activity." Lamont,
Controversial Aspects of Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense, 42 TAXYEs 808
(1964).
The courts have defined the terms as follows: "To be deductible under Section
162(a), an expenditure must constitute an expense of carrying on a trade or business,
as distinguished from some other type of expenditure made in connection with the
taxpayer's business." Burnett v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 4
RECENT CASES
penses. This reevaluation is particularly apparent in cases involving
taxpayers carrying tools to and from work.7
In Crowther v. Commissioner,8 the Ninth Circuit approved a deduc-
tion of transportation expenses incurred by a logger traveling to and
from northern California logging sites. Although the Ninth Circuit
indicated that Crowther's transporting of heavy tools was an im-
portant factor,9 the decision seemed to rest upon several factors: (1)
The taxpayer worked at the various sites temporarily; (2) there was
no housing available near the work site; and, (3) there was no
public transportation. The Ninth Circuit subsequently held: "We do
not think that our decision in Crowther depends on the fact that the
taxpayer in that case was required to carry his tools into the woods
with him."'10
In Rice v. Riddel,1 the district court allowed a deduction for
transportation expenses incurred by a musician who lived and per-
formed in metropolitan Los Angeles. He "operated his business"
from his home, and deducted the cost of driving his automobile to the
various temporary employment locations. To use public transportation
would have been impractical because the taxpayer had to carry several
bulky musical instruments. The Internal Revenue Service, in a later
"Ordinary as used in the statute [§ 1621 has the connotation of normal, customary, and
usual." Okemah Nat'l. Bank v. Wiseman, 253 F.2d 223, 226 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 821 (1958).
7 Crowther v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Rice v. Riddell, 179
F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Cal. 1959). In Charles Crowther, 28 T.C. 1293 (1957), the Tax
Court allowed the taxpayer to deduct the expense of transporting tools, although not
allowing a deduction for the total transportation expense. This decision was contrary
to the previous rule expressed by the Treasury in Rev. Rul. 25, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 152:
The expenses incurred by an employee in using his automobile for commut-
ing between his place of abode and his place of work (principal or regular
post of duty or employment), regardless of the distance involved, represent
nondeductible personal expenses within the purview of section 262 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, notwithstanding the fact that the automobile is
also used to transport tools used by the employee in his work.
The Crowther decision was followed by later decisions allowing a deduction for the
expenses involved in transporting tools. Francis Eaton, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 52 (1958)
(mechanic allowed a deduction for tool transportation expense); Henry P. Canclini,
26 P-H Tax Mem. 956 (1957) (logger allowed deduction for tool transportation ex-
pense); Benjamin C. Allenby, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 794 (1957) (logger allowed de-
duction for tool transportation expense). Contra, Ewell L. Teer, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
545 (1964).
8 269 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1959) (extending the ruling of the Tax Court to include
the total transportation expense).
0 Id. at 299.
10 Mathews v. Commissioner, 310 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962) (taxpayer, who did not
carry tools, allowed to deduct total expense of transportation to and from work as a
choker setter (logger) where there was no public transportation).
11 179 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
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ruling involving the same facts, implied that a deduction for the total
cost of private transportation would be allowed under Section 162 if
the taxpayer would have used public transportation but for the
tools.12
The Tax Court held that Sullivan's transportation expenses were
purely personal, distinguishing the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Crowther
as applicable only to the "very special facts of that case."'18 The Tax
Court's ruling that the taxpayer's carrying of his tools did not trans-
form the expense into a business expense placed the Tax Court in
opposition to the district court decision in Rice and the subsequent
Revenue Ruling.'4 The Second Circuit also considered the Internal
Revenue Service's Revenue Ruling too narrow " and would allow
the taxpayer to deduct the reasonable cost of transporting his tools
even if he would not have used public transportation.
Assuming that the Second Circuit was correct in liberalizing the
existing law, questions arise regarding the propriety of the rule. The
Second Circuit would allow a full deduction for transportation ex-
penses to one who would use public transportation but for the fact
that tools had to be carried; however, if public transportation would
not be used, then only a partial deduction would be allowed. The
application of this rule would result in discrimination against a
handicapped person who cannot deduct the expense of his private
transportation,16 and against one who has no access to public trans-
portation. For example, under the Sullivan rule, a person who is
12 Rev. Rul. 100, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 34.
Revenue Ruling 56-25. C.B. 1956-1, 152, states that expenses incurred by
an employee in using his automobile for commuting between his place of
abode and his principal or regular place of work represent nondeductible
personal expenses notwithstanding the fact that the automobile is also used
to transport tools used by the employee in his work. That ruling is hereby
modified to remove the implication that such transportation expenses would
not be deductible even if the employee would not have used his automobile
on such trips but for the necessity of taking his tools with him.
13 Lawrence D. Sullivan, 45 T.C. 217, 219 n.1 (1965).
14 Rev. Rul. I00, 1963-1 CuM, BULL. 34.
') 368 F.2d at 1008.
16 The courts have consistently held that the expense of private or special transpor-
tation necessitated by a physical disability is a personal expense and thus nondeductible.
Donnelly v. Commissiorier, 262 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959) (taxpayer could not practically
use public transportation because of disease, but was not allowed deduction for cost of
special private transportation); John C. Bruton, 9 T.C. 882 (1947) (diseased taxpayer
not allowed transportation expense even though he would have been unable to work
absent the expenditure). The Donnelly court also pointed out that the expense could
not be deducted under the provisions allowing for medical deductions. See Walter E.
Buck, 47 T.C. No. 10 (Dec. 10, 1966).
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healthy and who would use public transportation would be able to
deduct his total transportation expense if he had to carry tools which
would make public transportation impractical; however, the person
engaged in the same trade or business and who-carried the same tools,
but who had a personal handicap which made public transportation
impractical, or who had no access to public transportation would only
be allowed a deduction commensurate with the expense of trans-
porting his tools.
The Sullivan court would allow a person who would use private
transporation, even if he did not have to carry tools, to allocate the
expense of transportation between the expense of transporting the
person and the expense of transporting the tools, and then, to deduct
the tool transportation expense. Although the idea of allocating be-
tween "tool expenses" and "commuting expenses" is not novel, 7 the
court failed to set any guidelines as to the method of allocation.
To allow a deduction for the expense of carrying a small amount of
tools would seem to open the door to deductions for a large group of
taxpayers who regularly carry items related to their trade or business.18
It is possible, however, that Sullivan should have been allowed a
deduction for transportion expenses because he apparently traveled
substantial distances to various temporary job sites. 9
17 The Tax Court has previously held that the total transportation expense could
be allocated between personal transportation and tool transportation with a deduction
allowed for the latter. Charles Crowther, 28 T.C. 1293 (1957); Frands Eaton, 27 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 52 (1958) (on proper evidence, the cost of transporting tools may be
deducted from the total expense of transportation); Henry P. Canclini, 26 P-H Tax Ct.
Mfem. 956 (1957); Benjamin C. Allenby, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 794 (1957). None of
these cases, however, has provided any guidelines as to how to make the allocation.
The computations involved in each case indicate that a percentage is deducted, but the
computation of the percentage has never been revealed by the courts.
There are several possibilities for developing guidelines for allocating transportation
expenses. First, a predetermined percentage might be established which would be ap-
plicable in all tool transportation deduction cases. A second method would be to allow
the taxpayer to deduct the expense of having the tools carried by a delivery service if
such expense did not exceed the total cost of transportation. A third possibility would
be to allow a deduction based on the proportionate weight of the tools to the total
weight of the tools and the taxpayer.
18 The facts in Sullivan are similar to those in Ewell L. Teer, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
545 (1964), thus the Circuit Court might have done well to have followed the Teer
case. In Teer, a nurse was not allowed to deduct any transportation expenses, even
though she carried a satchel with her "tools," worked at various places temporarily,
and was partially disabled. The tools which Sullivan carried weighed little more than
a briefcase filled to its capacity. It is possible that lawyers, doctors, salesmen, teachers,
and others who must carry papers and other items necessary to their trade or business
will be allowed to deduct the cost of transporting these articles from their homes to
their place of employment.
19 The recent trend is to allow a taxpayer who must travel long distances to and
from temporary work sites, where neither adequate family housing nor public trans-
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With the above mentioned problems in mind, the following rule
is suggested. It should be ascertained whether or not the particular
trade or business in which the taxpayer is engaged requires that lie
carry bulky tools which make public transportation a practical im-
possibility. If it is determined that members of the trade or business
are required to carry such tools, then the total expense of transporta-
tion should be an allowable deduction whenever the taxpayer carries
the tools regardless of his individual needs or desires for private
transportation. This deduction should be limited by the smallest of
the following: (1) The cost of having the tools delivered by a delivery
service; (2) the excess of automobile expenses over the lesser of (a)
the cost of mass public transportation, if available, or (b) the cost of
taxi service, if available; or, (3) the storage cost at the job site if it
would be feasible for the taxpayer to store his tools.
WILLIAM D. PALMER
portation is available, to deduct the expense of such daily transportation between his
permanent home and the temporary work site. Mathews v. Commissioner, 310 F.2d 98
(9th Cir. 1962); Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962) (construction
worker allowed to deduct transportation expense to and from temporary work site
based on nearest feasible housing) ; Crowther v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 292 (9th Cir.
1959); Carlson v. Wright, 181 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Idaho 1959) (taxpayer allowed
to deduct the total expense of transportation when the distance traveled was long and
the work site only temporary).
There is no apparent difference between the taxpayer who travels to and from tempo-
rary work sites in rural areas, and the taxpayer, such as Sullivan, who travels sub-
stantially the same distance to temporary work sites in and around a large city.
